

Map 10. The Red Army's capture of Bukhara, 1920

tion of effect. Led by the 1st Eastern Muslim Regiment, the Reds made their first attempt to storm the city on 31 August but failed to carry the outer fortifications after a brief penetration. Poor use of artillery, uncoordinated employment of a small tank force, and vaguely framed objectives vitiated the effort. An exasperated Frunze lamented after learning of the attack: "If the operation will be conducted this unskillfully, the city will never be taken."<sup>86</sup>

On 31 August, G. V. Zinoviev arrived with elements of the First Army to assume overall command. After regrouping, Red forces staged an attack on 1 September against the eastern Karshin and Samarkand gates. Heavy street fighting followed a breakthrough of the outer fortifications. On 2 September, Red Army sappers blew a breach in the inner fortress wall, and a dawn artillery and aerial bombardment followed. Having held firmly as long as their defensive perimeter remained secure, the defenders wavered and then scattered before a Red assault by three rifle brigades, a regiment of cadets, and the 1st Muslim Regiment (formed by Bukharan Communists in Samarkand). The 4th Cavalry cleared the city in street-to-street fighting but, amidst the chaos and looting, failed to cover escape routes to the north and northeast. Taking advantage of poor Red Army intelligence and the dissolution of attacking forces inside the city, the emir, who by his own account was in his private residence outside the city when the attack began, managed to escape with about 500 mounted fighters. A Red aviation detachment subsequently reported the emir's movement northward. A cavalry unit picked up the trail but was detained by the emir's rear guard. Slipping deftly past a Red patrol near Kizil Tepe, the emir turned abruptly southward, hurried through the Ak Kutal Pass, and then rushed eastward to the fortress at Gissar. His escape would cost the Red Army dearly in the future but could not prevent the proclamation on 14 September of the Bukharan Peoples Republic.<sup>87</sup> In November, Kuibyshev proclaimed the Bukharan revolution the world's first peasant revolution against medieval, feudal exploitation.

Bolstered by military success, party activists frantically organized a political offensive. The Bukharan Union of Youth (BUY) formed in October 1920 and immediately began creating local chapters. There being no room in its ranks for passive members, the BUY conducted an intensive three-week training course in political agitation for new recruits. Yet zeal could not overcome all obstacles. Of the original nine members of the BUY Central Committee, four, all native Central Asians, were shortly expelled for dereliction of their responsibilities. To revitalize BUY, the party dispatched a small group of experienced Muslim organizers to Bukhara.<sup>88</sup>

The Bukharan Communist Party (BKP) experienced similar growing pains but, by its Third Congress in 1923, felt secure enough to purge its membership (1,560 full members and 167 candidates) of hostile class elements: merchants, landowners, mullahs, and former government bureaucrats. Reliance on proletarians created problems in recruitment, however, and many entering members possessed no formal education. Party figures indicated that 40 percent of the membership was illiterate and another 50 percent was only partially literate, a fact that hampered the dissemination of printed

propaganda. As evidence of further accommodation to local conditions, the membership was 70 percent Muslim. And despite its public commitment to women's equality, the BKP included only one native female.<sup>89</sup>

Meanwhile, under the guidance of the party, the Bukharan Red Army transformed itself in 1921 from a volunteer force to an army of two-year conscripts. The initial draft included 1,000 party members and 1,000 non-members.<sup>90</sup> The Bukharan Nazirat or Commissariat of Public Enlightenment assumed responsibility for predraft education of youths from age eight through sixteen. The program entailed both political indoctrination and physical training.<sup>91</sup>

Despite such organizational progress, however, liquidation of the resistance in the field remained incomplete. In 1921, the emir retained about 15,000 armed followers in the Bukhara region. The principal group of Basmachis withdrew under pressure to the fortress of Gissar in eastern Bukhara, which covered the approaches to the village of Kok-Tash where Ibragim Bek maintained a residence. Pursuit by Red forces, including the 1st Turkestan Cavalry Division, 1st Turkestan Cavalry Brigade, and 5th and 12th Rifle Regiments, continued beyond the Surkhan River. From there, Red units rampaged unchecked, occupying Dushanbe and other towns and driving the emir into refuge in Afghanistan.<sup>92</sup> Yet Soviet forces were unable to transform tactical success into strategic victory.

In defiance of the apparent logic of the battlefield, Basmachi uprisings erupted in the rear of Red Army units, sometimes in response to alleged Red outrages against the populace. The emir subsequently charged that Red soldiers executed 50,000 persons in the district of Ferez alone.<sup>93</sup> Remarkably, Basmachi strength in remote eastern Bukhara approached its peak in early 1922. Scattered Red units retreated in January, and in February, fighting returned to the Bukhara city environs.<sup>94</sup>

Just as the Basmachi movement drew upon heretofore unseen reserves of energy, Enver Pasha appeared on the scene in the spring of 1922 to infuse the resistance with a sense of political purpose and overarching military strategy. More than any other leader to serve the cause, Enver possessed the intellectual gifts and grasp of politics to form a coherent movement. Russian Central Asia, however, was scarcely more fertile soil on which to sustain a national (Pan-Turkic) movement than it was to nurture Bolshevik socialism. Tribal politics and a warlord mentality among its chieftains left the *Basmachestvo* weaker than the sum of its parts. Ibragim, on his part, continued to vie for leadership and operated independently. At the apex of his strength, Enver commanded up to 3,000 of the estimated 16,000 Basmachis in Bukhara and achieved, even in the assessment of Soviet scholar K. Vasilievskii, a broad-based popular support (*obshchenarodnyi*). In February, Enver's force occupied Dushanbe and briefly held much of Bukhara. Yet his strength was always limited by disunity and shortages of weapons, especially artillery and ammunition.<sup>95</sup>

In response to Enver's challenge, Red Army Commander S. S. Kamenev created the Bukharan Forces Group (under the control of the Turkestan

Front), which included 2 cavalry brigades, 2 cavalry squadrons, and 1 rifle division—7,530 men in all. The Reds pursued Enver in two columns, one to seal the Afghan frontier and the other to envelop him from the north and expel him from the fertile Gissar Valley. Over the course of a two-month campaign in eastern Bukhara, the Reds kept Enver on the run, recapturing Dushanbe in July and denying him any opportunity to assume the initiative or regather his strength. The final battle occurred east of Dushanbe, between Baldzhuvon and Khovaling, and ended in a Red triumph. Enver's influence came to a sudden end with his death in combat on 4 August 1922.<sup>96</sup>

Absent Enver's leadership, the Basmachi strength faded. Bands that had recently numbered from 500 to 1,000 subsequently diminished to as few as 25 or 30. As of January 1923, the Turkestan Front estimated Basmachi strength in the Bukharan Republic at 25 bands with a combined strength of 2,495 men. An additional 2,290 Basmachis continued to operate in eastern Bukhara.<sup>97</sup>

Turkestan Front Commander A. I. Kork continued to prosecute the war aggressively. The 3d Cavalry Brigade chased Selim-Pasha, Enver's deputy, deep into the mountains, conducted an encircling maneuver over a distance of 175 kilometers, and cornered his Basmachis in the geographical triangle of Koludar, Guzar, and Tengi-Khoram. On 13 March, the Reds achieved yet another tactical triumph but could not cut off the fleeing remnants of Selim's force, which maneuvered rapidly to the remote Lokai Valley in western Bukhara. At Lokai, among the last bastions of Basmachi strength, Selim linked up with Ibragim Bek to face the Red Army. Executing a swift flanking maneuver to strike the Basmachi rear, Red units delivered a devastating blow. Upon absorbing crippling losses, the Basmachis dispersed.<sup>98</sup>

Basmachi bands surfaced in western Bukhara again in 1924 and captured several towns only miles from Old Bukhara before the Red cavalry intervened. But such guerrilla attacks no longer galvanized a war-weary populace, and strikes against villages reconciled to Soviet rule proved counter-productive.<sup>99</sup> In all, the cumulative effect of military successes, skillful propaganda reinforced by pragmatic social policies, and infinitely superior organization enabled the Soviets to prevail.

### *Conclusion of the Basmachi Campaigns*

In the autumn of 1924, the Soviet government reorganized most of Central Asia into the Uzbek and Turkoman Soviet Socialist Republics and the Tajik Autonomous Republic. (Kirghizia would achieve autonomous status in 1926 and become a union republic in 1936.) Though symbolic of increasing Soviet control, political reorganization did not spell the end of conflict in remote rural areas.

The final pacification of Khiva continued for nearly a decade. Traditional strongman Dzhunaid Khan exploited political blunders by the fledgling (and soon to be absorbed by the Uzbek SSR) Khorezm Soviet Socialist Republic to seize the republican capital in Khiva in early 1924. He was particularly

aided by two decisions. First, the Khorezm leadership proclaimed the nationalization of religious lands and denied clergy the right to vote. Second, Red military units disarmed unreliable detachments of the Turkoman volunteers and executed their leaders. Moscow subsequently disbanded the Khorezm Republic and rushed military assistance to the region, but Dzhunaid carried on the struggle until his flight to Iran in 1927. Ibragim Bek launched a new offensive in the Lokai Valley region in 1926 only to be chased into Afghanistan. Further Afghan support of the Basmachi movement ended, however, with the signing of a treaty with the USSR in 1926.<sup>100</sup>

Soviet social policy reignited the resistance in 1928. Stalin's decision to collectivize agriculture stirred peasant resistance and precipitated famine in many parts of the Soviet Union, including Central Asia.<sup>101</sup> Ibragim reappeared yet again in Tajikistan in 1930–31, forcing the Soviet government to send the 83d Division of the OGPU (security forces) to help the Red Army restore order. Similarly, Dzhunaid Khan returned to Turkmenistan in 1931 and captured the Caspian Sea fort of Krasnovodsk before elements of the OGPU's 63d Division drove him back across the Iranian frontier. Even then, the establishment of Soviet power remained incomplete. Nomads in outlying areas of modern Turkmenistan and elsewhere continued to range across deserts and steppes beyond the reach of Soviet institutions.<sup>102</sup>

The Soviet defeat of the Basmachis stands apart in two fundamental respects from prior Russian experiences in fighting the Muslim tribal resistance in Central Asia and the Caucasus. First, by 1917, major towns and cities in Central Asia harbored a substantial Slavic and European population. Although the growing presence of immigrants alienated the natives, it also proved a pillar of moral and material support for the revolution. Second, unlike their imperial Russian predecessors, the Bolsheviks sought the full integration of Central Asia into the new order. Consequently, they had to cultivate greater sensitivity to the political and cultural nuances of their policies. Although Marxism-Leninism provided no clear blueprint for victory in Central Asia, it predisposed the Bolsheviks to undertake a social analysis of the theater of conflict. Above all, the Bolsheviks were aware of the significance of "political consciousness," whether more or less developed, in determining the will of a people to resist or seek accommodation.

This does not, of course, mean that the Bolsheviks—especially local cadres in Central Asia—were not guilty of serious errors in political judgment. They treaded heavily on native traditions (especially where the social roles of women and clergy were concerned), prematurely imposed conscription, and at times engaged in wanton destruction and atrocities. Furthermore, fulfillment of Kamenev's 1923 strategic vision proved difficult in reality. But they also possessed the ability to ameliorate the consequences of their mistakes. The Bolsheviks committed themselves to a major propaganda effort and repeatedly reversed or deferred unpopular decisions. Though bound to an ideological framework in their thinking, they—at least key figures such as Lenin, Stalin, Kuibyshev, Kamenev, and Frunze—exhibited a pragmatic instinct that served them well in crucial situations.

Thus tempered, ideology permitted the Bolsheviks to understand that the outcome in Central Asia must ultimately transcend events on the battlefield, that the military and political aspects of the war were thoroughly interwoven. What is perhaps the most remarkable evidence of this fact is the extent to which the Red Army was also an instrument of the political war. During crucial periods of the conflict, Red Army commanders exercised civil and military powers and, for the most part, did so effectively. Moreover, the Soviets made economic concessions and moderated their stance on religion. The creation of national units officered by natives—*notwithstanding significant defections*—was symbolically important. So, too, was the use of native Communists as political officers. Still, despite their success, it would be a mistake to conclude that Russian Bolsheviks in Central Asia had rid themselves of traditional ethnic chauvinism or a colonizer's mentality.<sup>103</sup> Nor, as would remain true until the dissolution of the USSR, had they won over the large rural populace to the Soviet order.

On the battlefield, the Reds successfully exploited the disunity of the resistance. Superior organization, tactics, and equipment eventually neutralized the natural advantages of the Basmachis. Once confined to the farthest reaches of the Soviet Union or reduced to raiding from across the border, the Basmachis no longer had access to the population and thus posed no great threat.


The success of the Red conquest of Central Asia is attributable to three general causes. First, with the exception of the brief period of Enver Pasha's command, the Basmachi resistance lacked even a semblance of cohesion. Second, the Reds overcame initial political errors and effectively adapted economic and social policies to local conditions, even at the cost of ideological concessions (which could later be reversed). And, third, the Red Army learned from its own experience, as well as from its study of imperial campaigns, how best to operate against an unconventional foe in the rugged deserts and mountains of Central Asia.

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# Notes

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## Chapter 3

1. The Red Army campaigns against the Basmachestvo have not been widely studied in the West. Although the political contours of the struggle are generally known, the exploits of the Red Army have received comparatively little scholarly examination. While Soviet scholars have produced many monographs on the upheavals in Central Asia, they have dealt only obliquely with the sharp cultural and religious cleavages between the Russian and Central Asian peoples that engendered political antagonism and resistance. Eden Naby, "The Concept of Jihad in Opposition to Communist Rule," *Central Asian Survey* 19, no. 3—4 (1986), points out that it was the Russians themselves who introduced concepts of ethnicity and national self-determination to Central Asia to encourage "the dismemberment of the Soviet area into five union republics . . ." The intent was to resist Pan-Islamic or Pan-Turkic tendencies.

A handful of recent Western scholarly studies have done much to improve the state of research on the Basmachis. See, in particular, Martha Olcott, "The Basmachi or Freeman's Revolt in Turkestan, 1918—24," *Soviet Studies* 33 (July 1981):352—69; Glenda Fraser, "Basmachi," *Central Asian Survey* 6, no. 1 (1987):1—74; no. 2 (1987):7—42; and Marie Broxup, "The Basmachi," *Central Asian Survey* 2, no. 1 (1983):57—82. Broxup provides a useful selected bibliography. Valuable general works on Central Asia include Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, *Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, 1979); Seymour Becker, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865—1924* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968); Michael Rywkin, *Moscow's Muslim Challenge* (Armonk, NY, 1982); Serge Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960); and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, *Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia: The Case of Tadzhikistan* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 1970). Many Soviet scholars, especially after 1978, identified scholarship on the Basmachi movement as a field of ideological struggle. See, in particular, A. I. Zevelev, Iu. A. Poliakov, and L. V. Shishkina, *Basmachestvo: Pravda istorii i vymysel fal'sifikatorov* (Moscow: Mysl', 1986).

2. Rywkin, *Moscow's Muslim Challenge*, 59. Rywkin cites data from *Aziatskaia Rossiia*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg: Glavnoe pereselenskoe upravlenie, 1921); and V. Denisev, "Bukhara," *Voennyi rabotnik Turkestana*, no. 2 (April 1922):93. Also, for an excellent analysis of migration patterns into Kazakhstan, see George Demko, *The Russian Colonization of Kazakhstan, 1896—1916* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969).
3. On the uprising of 1898, see Ann Sheehy, "The Andizhan Uprising of 1898 in Soviet Historiography," *Central Asian Review* 14, no. 2 (1966):139—50.
4. Ibid.; Rywkin, *Moscow's Muslim Challenge*, 17—19; and S. D. Asfandiarov, *Natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe vosstanie 1916 g. v Kazakhstane* (Alma-Ata, Kazakh S.S.R., 1936), 100—105.
5. Bennigsen and Wimbush, *Muslim National Communism*, 39—40.

6. Rywkin, *Moscow's Muslim Challenge*, 21–22; and Ann Shukman, "Soviet Central Asia: The Turkestan Commission, 1919–20," *Central Asian Review* 12, no. 1 (1964):5–15; and N. Berezin, "Istoriia krasnoi armii v Turkestane: Basmachestvo v Bukhare. Istoriia ego vozniknoveniia," *Voennyi rabotnik Turkestana*, no. 7 (September 1922):40. Stalin, the first commissar of nationalities, knew better but subsequently dismissed native nationalism on the ground that it was not the expression of the will of self-conscious proletarians. See also Fraser, "Basmachi," no. 1, 5–6.
7. Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union* (New York: Atheneum, 1974), 178–79. This is a superb study of the Basmachi movement in the broader context of Soviet national politics throughout the old empire.
8. Kh. Sh. Inoiatov, *Narody Srednei Azii v bor'be protiv interventov i unutrennei kontr-revoliutsii* (Moscow: Mysl', 1984), 31.
9. *Ibid.*, 74.
10. Iu. Poliakov and A. I. Chugunov, *Konets Basmachestva* (Moscow: Nauka, 1976), 35.
11. Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union*, 178.
12. Mustafa Chokaev, "The Basmachi Movement in Turkestan," *Asiatic Review* 24 (1928): 280–83, as cited in Fraser, "Basmachi," no. 1, 5.
13. *M. V. Frunze na frontakh grazhdanskoi voiny*, sbornik dokumentov (Moscow: Voennoe izdatel'stvo, 1941), 275, telegram, Frunze to Lenin, 24 March 1920. This work is a compilation of documents, especially orders and telegrams from Frunze's service on various fronts of the civil war. Various Soviet sources make extravagant claims concerning the extent of outside, notably British, support for the Basmachis. Inoiatov, *Narody Srednei Azii*, 9, explicitly compares the situation in Turkmenia to the funneling of American aid to Afghanistan after 1979. On page 70, Inoiatov claims the Whites provided 25,000 rifles to the Fergana Basmachis. Although assertions that the Basmachis received assistance are plausible, the motley assortment they employed in the field suggests that outside support could not have been extensive. An early Soviet source, Berezin, "Istoriia krasnoi armii," 39, notes that intercepted letters of Enver Pasha include complaints of insufficient outside support.
14. D. Lavrenev, "Gornaia voina," *Voennyi rabotnik Turkestana*, no. 1 (March 1922), as quoted in Helene Aymen de Lageard, "The Revolt of the Basmachi According to Red Army Journals, 1920–1922," *Central Asian Survey* 6, no. 3 (1987):23. De Lageard surveys several military publications during a two-year period and provides their most salient observations on the war in translation.
15. B. Usmankhodzhaev, "Boevye dela Revkoma," in *V boiakh za sovetskuiu vlast' v ferganskoi doline* (Tashkent, Uzbek S.S.R., 1957), 22–23.
16. Iu. Baitmatov, "Epizody iz geroicheskikh boev sovetskikh voisk," in *V boiakh za sovetskuiu vlast'*, 44–49.
17. Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union*, 182; and G. Safarov, *Kolonial'naia revoliutsiia, opyt Turkestana* (Moscow, 1921), 133.
18. "Nasha politika v Turkestane," *Zhizn' natsional'nostei*, 21 March 1920.
19. *M. V. Frunze na frontakh*, 274, telegram, Frunze to Lenin, 24 March 1920; and E. Kozlovskii, *Krasnaia armia v Srednei Azii* (Tashkent, 1928), 37, as cited in Fraser, "Basmachi" 6, no. 1 (1987):40.
20. Aleksandrov, "Organizatsiia vysshego upravleniia krasnoi armiei turkestanskoi respubliki v 1919 g.," *Voennyi rabotnik Turkestana*, no. 2 (March 1922):71.
21. Broxup, "The Basmachi," 68; and A. Iur'ev, "Boevoi put' vozhd'ia," *Krasnaia zvezda*, 3 November 1925.
22. *M. V. Frunze na frontakh*, 280, telegram, 23 May 1920. Frunze also complained about the exclusion of the Transcaspia District (Turkmenia) from the control of the Turkestan Front.

23. Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union*, 184.
24. Ibid., 183; and "The Basmachis: The Central Asian Resistance Movement, 1918—1924," *Central Asian Review* 7, no. 3 (1959):239.
25. M. V. Frunze *na frontakh*, 289, telegram, 27 August 1920.
26. Olcott, "The Basmachi," 358.
27. M. V. Frunze *na frontakh*, 278—79 (directive to the Turkestan Front, 7 May 1920); Mi. I. Vladimirov, et al., *M. V. Frunze: Voennaia i politicheskaiia deiatel'nost'* (Moscow: Voennoe izdatel'stvo, 1984), 125; and Shukman, "Soviet Central Asia," 10.
28. Inoiatov, *Narody srednei azii*, 222; and *Istoriia grazhdanskoi voiny v Uzbekistane*, vol. 2 (Tashkent, Uzbek S.S.R.: FAN, 1970), 279.
29. D. Liianov, "K voprosu o prizyve inorodtsev v Krasnuiu Armiiu," *Zhizn' natsional'nostei*, 10 October 1920; and N. Lykoshkin, "Lokot' k loktiu," *Voennaia mysl'* (May—July 1921):27, as cited in de Lageard, "The Revolt of the Basmachi," 12.
30. "Obiavlennie: Vsem musul'manskim organizatsii R.K.P. . . . natsional' nykh men'shestvu," *Zhizn' natsional'nostei*, 14 September 1919; Zvers, introductory note to archival index, fund 17 (Central Muslim Military College), Central State Archive of the Soviet Army.
31. O. Khudoverdiev, "Bukharskaia Krasnaia Armiia," *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, no. 9 (1981), as translated in JPRS (Joint Publications Research Service) 79812, 7 January 1982, USSR Report MA 1643, 113—14; and "Doklad soveta narodnykh nazirov BNSR ob obuchenii voennomu iskusstvu i o fizicheskom vospitanii detei i iunoshei, 21 July 1921," in *Istoriia Bukharskoi Narodnoi Respubliki (1920—1924 gg., sbornik dokumentov)* (Tashkent, Uzbek S.S.R.: Izdatel'stvo FAN, 1926), 244—45.
32. Rywkin, *Moscow's Muslim Challenge*, 36; and A. Kokanbaev, *Bor'ba s basmachestvom i uprochenie sovetskoi v Fergane* (Tashkent, Uzbek S.S.R.: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo Uzbekskoi S.S.R., 1958), 74—75.
33. M. V. Frunze *na frontakh*, 283, telegram, 27 May 1920.
34. Fraser, "Basmachi," no. 1, 35.
35. M. V. Frunze *na frontakh*, 296—97, telegram Frunze to Lenin, 12 June 1920; and Dm. Furman, untitled article from *Pravda*, 4 July 1920, as printed in *Inostrannaia voennaia interventsia i grazhdanskaia voina v Srednei Azii i Kazakhstane*, vol. 1 (Alma Ata, Kazakh S.S.R.: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk Kazakhskoi SSR, 1963), 376—78.
36. Poliakov and Chugunov, *Konets basmachestva*, 44.
37. Broxup, "The Basmachi," 60; and Olcott, "The Basmachi," 359.
38. Olcott, "The Basmachi," 359; and Fraser, "Basmachi," no. 1, 8.
39. Olcott, "The Basmachi," 350; and Broxup, "The Basmachi," 61.
40. Ibid.
41. Fraser, "Basmachi," no. 2, 7—8. Fraser cites a document of the India Office, 1922.
42. Aleksandrov, "Organizatsiia vysshego upravleniia," 71—72; and D. Zuev, "K kraevoi partinnoi konferentsii k soveshchaniu voennykh delegatov kraevoi partikonferentsii," *Voennyi rabotnik Turkestana*, no. 7 (September 1922):31.
43. D. Zuev, "Primenenie norm polevogo ustava k osobennostiam sredne-aziatskikh teatrov voennykh deistvii," *Voennyi rabotnik Turkestana*, no. 1 (March 1922):25—31.
44. Lavrenev, "Gornaia voina," as quoted in de Lageard, 16—20.
45. Central State Archive of the Soviet Army, fund 110 (Turkestan Front), index 3, item 1402, sheets 1—18.
46. Ibid., sheets 5—9; Broxup, "The Basmachi," 69; M. V. Frunze *na frontakh*, 314—15, Order to the Fergana Front, 28 May 1920; M. M. Kozlov, "Vklad M. V. Frunze v razvitiu strategii

- i operativnogo iskusstva," *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, no. 3 (1985):31—34; and *Inostrannaia voennaia interventsia*, 434—36.
47. *Istoriia grazhdanskoi voiny*, 117, 126—27.
  48. A. A. Kotenev, "O razgrome basmacheskikh band v Srednei Azii," *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, no. 2 (1987):61—63; Kozlov, "Vklad M. V. Frunze," 33; and A. Tasin, "Obzor raboty vozdushnogo flota v Turkestana za 1920," *Voennaia mysl'* (May—July 1921):191, as cited in de Lageard, "The Revolt of the Basmachi," 191.
  49. *Ibid.*; and M. V. Frunze na frontakh, 276—78, telegram, 10 April 1920.
  50. D. Zuev, "Osobennosti oboznogo dela v Turkestane," *Voennyi rabotnik Turkestana*, no. 2 (April 1922):52—60.
  51. N. Siniavskii, "Geliosviaz'," *Voennoe delo v Srednei Azii*, no. 1 (September 1922):54—56; N. Liapin, "Chimganskii pokhod," *Krasnaia zvezda*, 15 October 1925.
  52. Stabs-kapitan Maksimovich, "Geliosviaz' i geliografnaia komanda v Akhal-tekinskoi ekspeditsii 1880—1881 gg.," *Voennyi sbornik*, no. 8 (1881):289—90.
  53. V. Ionov, "V gorakh—gornaia artilleria," *Voennoe delo v Srednei Azii*, no. 1 (September 1922):40—50.
  54. Liapin, "Chimganskii pokhod."
  55. P. Antonov, "Taktika bor'by s basmachestvom," *Krasnaia zvezda*, 8 December 1925.
  56. Vladimirov, M. V. Frunze, 126; and A. A. Epishev, "Voenno-politicheskaia deiatel'nost' M. V. Frunze," *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, no. 3 (1985):25.
  57. Valerian Vladimirovich Kuibyshev: *Biografiia* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1988), 131—32.
  58. *Ibid.*
  59. G. Markov, "Antireligioznaia propaganda sredi narodov vostoka," *Voennyi rabotnik Turkestana*, no. 2 (April 1922):39—40; Central State Archive of the Soviet Army, Moscow, Russia, fund 25895 (Central Asian Military District), index 1, item 11, sheets 2—6.
  60. Inoiatov, *Narody Srednei Azii*, 220.
  61. "Polozhenie basmachestva (Beseda s komanduiushchim voiskami Turkfronta tov. Levandovskim)," *Krasnaia zvezda*, 10 September 1925.
  62. *Ibid.*; and Vasilevskii, "Fazy basmacheskogo dvizheniia v srednei Azii," *Novyi vostok* 29 (1930):135.
  63. "The Basmachis," 246; and M. Irkaev, *Istoriia grazhdanskoi voiny v Tadzhikistane* (Dushanbe: Irfan, 1971), 386—87. See also William Ritter, "Revolt in the Mountains: Fuzail Maksum and the Occupation of Garm," *Journal of Contemporary History* 35 (1990):547—80.
  64. "Operativnaia svodka shtata ferganskoi armeiskoi gruppy o boevykh deistviiakh protiv Basmacheskikh shaek," 7 November 1920, in *Inostrannaia voennaia interventsia*, 470—71.
  65. Broxup, "The Basmachi," 63—64; Olcott, "The Basmachi," 363; and A. Castagne, *Les Basmachis* (Paris, 1925), 52.
  66. Kokanbaev, *Bor'ba s basmachestvom*, 54—57; and "Svodka shtaba ferganskogo fronta o chislennosti i raspolozhenii otriadov Basmachei," 8 October 1920, in *Inostrannaia voennaia interventsia*, 462—63.
  67. "The Basmachis," 237; *Istoriia grazhdanskoi voiny*, 53; Inoiatov, *Narody Srednei Azii*, 72; and S. B. Ginzburg, "Basmachestvo v Fergane," *Novyi vostok* 10—11 (1925):185—89.
  68. Fraser, "Basmachi," no. 1, 30.
  69. Kokanbaev, *Bor'ba s basmachestvom*, 57—58.
  70. *Ibid.*, 68—70; *Istoriia grazhdanskoi voiny*, 56—57; R. Madaminov, "Kokandskie sobytiia," in *V boiakh za sovetskuiu vlast'*, 11; "The Basmachis," 239; and Rywkin, *Moscow's Muslim*


*Challenge*, 35. It is worth noting that thousands of Volga Tatars and Bashkirs had served in the Red Army during the struggle against the Whites in the South Urals and Western Siberia. Bashkir cavalry also figured in the final Red offensive against Poland.

71. Kokanbaev, *Bor'ba s basmachestvom*, 67.
72. *Istoriia grazhdanskoi voiny*, 116—17, 128.
73. Kokanbaev, *Bor'ba s basmachestvom*, 76—77; and Inoiatov, *Narody Srednei Azii*, 291.
74. Rywkin, *Moscow's Muslim Challenge*, 36; and Kokanbaev, *Bor'ba s basmachestvom*, 74—75.
75. I. Kas'kov, I. Ulianov, K. Iachmenov, et al. *Boevoi put' voisk turkestanskogo voennogo okruga* (Moscow: Voenizdat', 1959), 122—24, 148—49.
76. Kotenev, "O razgrome basmacheskikh band," 60; Fraser, "Basmachi," no. 2. Fraser uses papers from the British Foreign Office.
77. Vasilevskii, "Fazy," 135.
78. Arkadii Borisov, "Basmachestvo v Tadzhikistane," *Krasnaia zvezda*, 13 November 1925.
79. *Istoriia grazhdanskoi voiny*, 62; Becker, *Russia's Protectorates*, 204, 290; and Iakubov, "Bukharskaia operatsiia," *Voina i revoliutsiia*, no. 8 (1931):90.
80. Iakubov, "Bukharskaia operatsiia," 90—91; and Ia. A. Mel'kumov, *Turkestantsy* (Moscow: Voennoe izdatel'stvo, 1960), 10—11. Mel'kumov was a brigade commander in the 1st Cavalry Division. Some Soviet sources assert that Frunze operated against a force of 40,000 in Bukhara, but it is improbable. Moreover, even had such a force existed, it could not have concentrated in a single effort.
81. Iakubov, "Bukharskaia operatsiia," 92; and Fraser, "Basmachi," no. 1, 48. Fraser quotes directly from the emir's own account of the action (as recorded in the India Office), which is no less biased than Soviet accounts but does contain some noteworthy details.
82. Iakubov, "Bukharskaia operatsiia," 93; and Mel'kumov, *Turkestantsy*, 10—12.
83. Mel'kumov, *Turkestantsy*, 12; Iakubov, "Bukharskaia operatsiia," 93—94; and M. V. Frunze *na frontakh*, 320—25 (directive to the Turkestan Front, 12 August 1920).
84. Iakubov, "Bukharskaia operatsiia," 94—95; and M. V. Frunze *na frontakh*, 323—25 (directive to the Turkestan Front, 25 August 1920).
85. Mel'kumov, *Turkestantsy*, 24.
86. Iakubov, "Bukharskaia operatsiia," 96—98; Mel'kumov, *Turkestantsy*, 24—25; and Kaskov, *Boevoi put'*, 134—35.
87. Kas'kov, *Boevoi put'*, 134—35, 146—48; Iakubov, "Bukharskaia operatsiia," 99—101; Mel'kumov, *Turkestantsy*, 25—26; Fraser, "Basmachi," no. 1, 48; and Valerian Vladimirovich Kuibyshev, 144.
88. "Doklad TsK Bukharskogo Soiuza Molodezh'ob organizatsii i deiatel'nosti komandskikh organizatsii v Bukhare," 25 October 1980, in *Istoriia Bukharskoi Narodnoi Respubliki*, 80—83.
89. "Iz informatsionnoi svodki Sredazbiuro TsK RKP o politicheskom i ekonomicheskom polozhenii Bukharskoi Respubliki o sovetskom stroitel'stve i sostoianii partii," 15 January 1924, in *Istoriia Bukharskoi Narodnoi Respubliki*, 131—38.
90. Khudoberdiev, "Bukharskaia Krasnaia Armiia," 113—14.
91. "Dekret soveta narodnykh nazirov BNSR," in *Istoriia Bukharskoi Narodnoi Respubliki*, 244—45.
92. Kas'kov, *Boevoi put'*, 146; and Vasilevskii, "Fazy," 133.
93. Fraser, "Basmachi," no. 1, 52.
94. Vasilevskii, "Fazy," 133.
95. *Ibid.*, 134; Becker, *Russia's Protectorates*, 304; and Fraser, "Basmachi," no. 1, 60.

96. Kas'kov, *Boevoi put'*, 159—63. Kotenev, "O razgrome basmacheskikh band," 61, identifies the units as the 1st and 2d Independent Turkestan Cavalry Brigades, the 3d Turkestan Rifle Division, and 2 cavalry squadrons for a total of 4,500 infantry, 3,030 cavalry, and 20 field guns. D. Zuev, *Turkestanskaia Pravda*, no. 22 (1922), as reprinted in *Istoriia Bukharskoi Narodnoi Respubliki*, 260—63.
  97. "Doklad TsK BKP v Sredazbiuro TsK RKP ob itogakh raboty TsK za period s ianvaria po oktiabr' 1922 g.," 22 October 1922, in *Istoriia Bukharskoi Narodnoi Respubliki*, 119; and Irkaev, *Istoriia grazhdanskoi voiny v Tadzhikistane*, 383—84.
  98. Ibid.
  99. A. Zler, "Musul'manskie otriady," *Krasnaia zvezda*, 3 September 1925; and A. Borisov, "Basmachestvo v Tadzhikistane."
  100. Iu. Ibragimov, "Krasnyi Turkestan, Khiva," *Zhizn' natsional'nostei*, 20 April 1919; and Olcott, "The Basmachi," 360—63. See also Ritter, "Revolt in the Mountains."
  101. Central State Archive of the Soviet Army, Moscow, fund 25895 (Central Asian Military District), index 1, item 62, sheets 12—13. A 1931 "top secret" situation report by the Military Revolutionary Council of the Central Asian Military District obliquely referred to the role of disruptive economic policies in stirring opposition.
  102. Ibid., sheet 22. This document is a "top secret" report by a member of the Central Asian Military District on the latest Basmachi incursions.
  103. Mustafa Chokay, *Turkestan pod vlast'iu sovetov* (Paris: Iash Turkestan, 1935; reprint, Society for Central Asian Studies), 89.
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